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THE UNION SUBSTITUTION HYPOTHESIS
REVISITED: DO JUDICIALLY CREATED
EXCEPTIONS TO THE
TERMINATION-AT-WILL
DOCTRINE HURT UNIONS?
NANCY R. HAUSERMAN
CHERYL L. MARANTO
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1987, the Executive Council of the AFL-CIO has undertaken a
lobbying effort in favor of expanding current exceptions to the termination-
at-will doctrine. Although attempts to modify the termination-at-will doc-
trine are hardly unique, it is important to note the proponent of this partic-
ular call for modification. The AFL-CIO, along with many international
unions, has long maintained that the protection against unjust and arbitrary
dismissal is an important advantage provided by unionization. Union sup-
porters have often asserted the "union substitution hypothesis," i.e., that
the furnishing of such protection by the legislatures or the courts would act
as a substitute for union protection and would undermine support for the
unions. In an era of declining union membership, the current AFL-CIO
position seems, at least at first glance, remarkably untimely: Why would
the unions affirmatively give up what they consider to be one of the essential
advantages union membership continues to offer?
This Article examines some of the reasons why unions might indeed
support such legislation and suggests that union support for exceptions to
termination-at-will is not likely to negatively affect union growth. The Ar-
ticle begins with a consideration of several reasons commonly advanced for
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the continuing decline in levels of unionization. Since union support for
limitations on termination-at-will would appear most inconsistent with the
union substitution hypothesis, this hypothesis will be discussed at some
length. This section is followed by a brief discussion of the termination-at-
will doctrine, and the exceptions thereto, including coverage by collective
bargaining agreements. The Article then considers a statistical study done
by the authors which seeks to assess the claim that the broadening of excep-
tions to termination-at-will has negatively affected union growth. In fact,
the results of this study provide virtually no support for the proposition that
the existence of exceptions to the termination-at-will doctrine has been a
cause of the shrinkage in union membership. Moreover, the results of the
authors' study also suggest that to the extent that exceptions to termina-
tion-at-will can lessen the effect of employer animus toward unions, by re-
ducing the number of terminations based on perceptions of an employee's
union sympathies, such exceptions might actually further union growth.
The Article concludes with a discussion of why unions might favor limita-
tions on the termination-at-will doctrine.
II. THE DECLINE OF UNIONIZATION
Since 1953, the proportion of nonagricultural workers who are union
members has declined from a peak of 32.5% to 16.8% in 1988.' The per-
centage of National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") elections in which a
union has been selected as a collective bargaining representative has also
declined, from 71% in 1953 to 43% in 1983.2 Several explanations have
been advanced concerning the decline in union membership. These expla-
nations include changes in the economic structure of the United States,
union suppression, and union substitution by government.3
Proponents of the argument that union membership declines are due to
structural changes in the economy cite two primary factors. The first factor
is geographical in nature and the second represents a shift in industry.4
Since 1961, there has been a movement of workers away from the heavily
unionized Northeast and Midwest to the "Sunbelt" states of the South and
1. Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at B-13 (Jan. 30, 1989); L. TROY & N. SHEFLIN, U.S. UNION
SOURCEBOOI 3-5, 3-10 (1985).
2. 47 NLRB ANN. REP. Table 15B (1982); 18 NLRB ANN. REP. Table 13A (1953).
3. Fiorito & Maranto, The Contemporary Decline of Union Strength, 5 CONTEMP. POL'Y IS-
suEs 12, 13 (1987); Beyond Unions: A Revolution in Employee Rights is in the Making, Bus. WK.
73 (July 8, 1985) [hereinafter Beyond Unions].
4. Craver, The Current and Future Status of Labor Organizations, 36 LAB. L.J. 210, 211-13
(1985); Usery & Henne, The American Labor Movement in the 1980s, 7 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 251,
253 (1981).
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the West.' From 1961 to 1984, the percentage of workers residing in met-
ropolitan areas in the Northeast and Midwest declined from 35% to 26%,
and from 33% to 26% respectively. 6 Meanwhile, there has been an in-
crease from 19% to 28% in the South and from 14% to 20% in the West.7
Because of historical anti-union sentiment and the existence of right-to-
work legislation, labor unions have traditionally found the South and
Southwest to be difficult areas in which to organize.'
The second factor cited in the discussion of structural changes in the
economy is the shift away from manufacturing jobs to "massive growth in
white-collar and service occupations, areas that unions have traditionally
found difficult to organize."9 Since 1960, it is estimated that the average
number of workers involved in manufacturing has dropped from about
31% of the nonagricultural workforce to 19 %. 1 As the percentage of man-
ufacturing jobs has decreased, there has been a corresponding increase in
service-type employment. Recent figures show this total to be nearly 75%
of the nonagricultural workforce.1
Union suppression is also advanced as a significant reason for the de-
cline in union membership.12 Union suppression refers to both legal and
illegal tactics taken by management to preserve their nonunion status.13
Several studies have shown illegal activities by management to be a major
factor in the decline of union organizing success. 14 One author referred to
management actions as "a rapidly growing unlawful activity that seriously
impairs the opportunity of work groups to make unfettered decisions about
the costs and benefits of union representation.""5 In recent years, manage-
5. See, e.g., Craver, supra note 4; Usery & Henne, supra note 4; The De-unionization of
America, THE ECONOMIST 71 (Oct. 29, 1983).
6. Doyle, Area Wage Surveys Shed Light on Declines in Unionization, MONTHLY LAB. REV.
13, 16 (Sept. 1985) (table 4).
7. Id.
8. Craver, The Vitality of the American Labor Movement in the Twenty-first Century, 1983 U.
ILL. L. REv. 633, 637-38.
9. Usery & Henne, supra note 4, at 253.
10. Id.; see also 110 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 68 (March 1987); 84 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 302,
305 (March 1961).
11. 110 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 68 (March 1987).
12. See, e.g., supra note 3; R. FREEMAN & J. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? (1984);
Betton, The Three Faces of Unionism: Managerial Opposition to Labor Unions, An Empirical and
Theoretical Analysis, 37 LAB. L.J. 555 (1986); Cooke, The Rising Toll of Discrimination Against
Union Activities, 24 INDUS. REL. 421 (1985); Lawler & West, The Impact of Union Avoidance
Strategy in Representation Elections, 24 INDUS. REL. 406 (1985); Weiler, Promises to Keep: Secur-
ing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1769 (1983).
13. T. KOCHAN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 183 (1980).
14. See sources cited supra note 12.
15. Cooke, supra note 12, at 440.
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ment has used more sophisticated techniques developed by professional
behaviorists acting as "management consultants." 6 These consultants are
hired to discourage unionizing, and they are apparently enjoying unprece-
dented demand for their services.17 For many employers, the costs associ-
ated with these "union-busters" is, or appears to be, considerably less than
the costs associated with employee unionization. Moreover, some employ-
ers view the choice to hire a management consultant as a purely economic
decision, "without regard to moral or systemic considerations." 18 Over the
past few years, these consultants have been very successful. Indeed, it has
been argued that "[t]hese techniques have become so well developed that
. . . almost no sophisticated employer who is willing to make the effort
need find its work force unionized against its will."' 9
In addition to the use of consultants to stymie union growth, there has
been a large increase over the past two decades in the number of unlawful
employee discharges based on union support.
[I]n 1957, 922 section 8(a)(3) discharges were directed reinstated in
NLRB proceedings, while by 1970 the number of such dis-
criminatees had risen to 3779. Yet, by 1980, the number of such
illegally terminated individuals exceeded 10,000. . . . [D]uring
1980, one out of every twenty employees who voted in favor of the
union in. . . [NLRB] representation elections, presumably the pri-
mary union organizers, was unlawfully discharged.20
Of the discharged employees who were reinstated, only 40% accepted rein-
statement, and 80% of those who did return left their jobs within two years
of reinstatement.2 1 The total number of unfair labor practice charges
against employers, all Section 8(a) charges, increased 130%, and those al-
leging discrimination against employees for their union activity, Section
8(a)(3) charges, increased 81% between 1969 and 1982. This increase in
charges filed has been accompanied by increasing remedies awarded by the
NLRB. Reinstatement and backpay awards increased 72 and 300%, re-
spectively, between 1969 and 1982.22
16. Craver, supra note 8, at 647.
17. Gould, The Decline (and Rise?) of Unions, THE CENTER MAG. 25, 26 (March/April
1986).
18. Craver, supra note 4, at 213-14.
19. Usery & Henne, supra note 4, at 254. This comment may reflect a degree of overstate-
ment since, arguably, if any employer could successfully resist unionization, there would be little
incentive for any union to try to organize any employer.
20. Craver, supra note 4, at 214.
21. Id.
22. 48 NLRB ANN. REP. Table 4 (1983); 34 NLRB ANN. REP. Table 2 (1969).
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A third reason often cited for the declining rate of unionization in the
United States is based on a hypothesis that rights and protections that were
previously provided to organized employees only under collective bargain-
ing agreements are now provided at least in part to unorganized workers.23
These rights and protections have been provided by judicial decisions and
various legislative enactments. Referred to as the "union substitution hy-
pothesis," this reason for union decline continues to be advanced in both
scholarly24 and business publications.2" The labor movement has fre-
quently shared this view. Samuel Gompers and the AFL opposed all social
welfare schemes for adult men eligible to join unions.26 This position re-
flected a philosophical preference for voluntarism and also a fear that such
schemes would reduce employees' demands for union representation. As
late as January 1932, AFL President Green called unemployment insurance
a "union-wrecking measure. '  Advocates of the union substitution hy-
pothesis often point to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,28 the Occupational
Safety and Health Act ("OSH Act"),29 and exceptions to the termination-
at-will doctrine as sources of protection that might substitute for union
protection.30
Somewhat surprisingly, the union substitution hypothesis appears to
have maintained its credibility in spite of several factors which would seem
to mitigate the importance of any substitution effect. Notably, the growth
or decline of unions does not clearly correlate with the passage of so-called
substitute legislation, and the extent to which the legislation actually "sub-
stitutes" for the union is questionable. For instance, the late 1930s and
early 1940s saw tremendous union growth;31 Congress passed legislation
creating minimum wage requirements32 and Social Security.3 3 Similarly,
although the decline in union membership began in the mid 1950s,34 legisla-
23. Aaron, Future Trends in Industrial Relations Law, 23 INDUS. REL. 52, 55 (1984).
24. See, e.g., Neumann & Rissman, Where Have All the Union Members Gone?, 2 J. LAB.
ECON. 175 (1984), Steiber, Employment-at- Will: An Issue for the 1980s, 36 INDUS. REL. RES. A.
1, 12 n.39 (1983).
25. See, e.g., Beyond Unions, supra note 3.
26. H. PELLING, AMERICAN LABOR 123 (1960) (The CIO, however, supported the passage of
social welfare legislation.).
27. Id. at 152; Craver, supra note 8, at 658 n.184.
28. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
29. Occupational Safety and Health Act, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970).
30. Smith, Exceptions to the Employment-at-Will Doctrine, 36 LAB. L.J. 875, 882-88 (1985).
31. L. TROY & N. SHEFLIN, supra note 1, at 3-10.
32. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982).
33. Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935).
34. Weiler, supra note 12, at 1772.
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tion like the OSH Act 35 and Title VII, 36 which could also be viewed as
union substitution legislation, was not passed until the mid to late 1960s.
Furthermore, the union substitution hypothesis, to the extent that it im-
plies that various legal protections eliminate the need for unions or union
protections, appears incorrect. The legal protections may reduce the addi-
tional amount of protection expected from the collective bargaining pro-
cess, but they are unlikely to eliminate the same because legal protections
are imperfect substitutes for union representation. In fact, the unions may
be instrumental in achieving the goals of legislation. For example, the OSH
Act purports to assure a certain degree of workplace safety.37 The Labor
Department is charged with the responsibility of enforcing the mandates of
the OSH Act, which it does by conducting workplace inspections. 38 But
one study suggests that only two percent of the total firms regulated by the
OSH Act are inspected per year.39 Some of those inspections occur because
of workplace accidents or worker complaints.' Obviously, in 98% of the
regulated firms the responsibility for compliance with OSH Act standards
rests almost entirely with the employers. The degree to which employers
meet their compliance responsibility can be greatly influenced by the un-
ions. Indeed, although the unions do not generally bargain about specific
occupational hazards, they do:
concentrate on negotiating agreements that permit enforcement of
standards set by others, establishing procedures for resolving health-
and-safety-related labor-management disputes, obtaining agreements
governing work rules and wage rates that are in some way sensitive
to the existence of job hazards, and establishing training programs to
make their members more safety-conscious.41
Furthermore, the union, through its representative(s), is continually
present in the workplace and can monitor the safety program and, if neces-
sary, report any continuing violations to the Labor Department.42 Essen-
tially, the presence of the union can serve as a less formal enforcement
mechanism of OSH Act standards. Again, the passage of the OSH Act has
not really taken the place of a union because it is not an "either/or" situa-
35. See supra note 29.
36. See supra note 28.
37. 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1982).
38. 29 U.S.C. § 657 (1982).
39. L. BACOW, BARGAINING FOR JOB SAFETY AND HEALTH 13 (1980) (citing Nichols &
Zeckhauser, Government Comes to the Workplace: An Assessment of OSHA, 49 THE PUB. INTER-
EsT 39 (1977)).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 86.
42. Id. at 57.
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tion. Instead, the existence of unions may enhance the protections provided
by the legal system; similarly, the legal protections may enhance the per-
ceived importance of unions.
Moreover, although there are certain similarities between the OSH Act
and the unions, there are obvious differences. Both the unions and the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") seek to improve
the lives of workers by controlling or directing the conduct of management
to varying degrees. The issues that the unions deal with, however, are con-
siderably more varied than the concerns of the OSH Act. Furthermore, the
rules that OSHA promulgates must necessarily apply to a wide range of
industries. Unions, on the other hand, negotiate for specific workplace
"rules" that are likely to be more industry and firm-specific, and more flexi-
ble than OSHA's regulations. Finally, the union's constant presence in the
workplace provides a greater opportunity to enforce the rules and influence
events that might affect the costs of compliance with such rules. 3
In light of the contrary factual information about the effects of union
substitution legislation, it is interesting that this theory continues to be ad-
vanced as a cause of union decline.' The union substitution hypothesis
may be suggested when exceptions to termination-at-will are considered be-
cause, unlike the earlier social legislation, exceptions to termination-at-will
can protect employees from unjust discharge. Thus, these exceptions may
be seen as effectively substituting for what is often considered to be a basic
or primary function of unions - protection against discharge without
cause.45 Indeed, in a 1984 study, Neumann and Rissman argued that their
results supported a conclusion that union membership declined as a result
of judicial exceptions to the termination-at-will doctrine.46 It is especially
noteworthy then that the AFL-CIO would advance legislation that could be
seen as a substitute for the union and it is particularly timely to empirically
test the effects of existing judicial exceptions to the termination-at-will
doctrine.
43. Id. at 56-57.
44. Of course, implicit in the union substitution hypothesis is the assumption that employees
are actually aware of the substituting policies and such an assumption may be incorrect. A tele-
phone survey in Nebraska, conducted before Nebraska had any recognized exceptions to the ter-
mination-at-will doctrine, found that few respondents (8 to 22%, depending on age) were even
aware that an employer had a legal right to discharge an employee without cause. In other words,
the respondents were not aware of the termination-at-will doctrine and would therefore not fully
appreciate union protection from the same. See Forbes & Jones, 4 Comparative, Attitudinal, and
Analytical Study of Dismissal of At-Will Employees Without Cause, 37 LAB. L.J. 157, 165 (1986).
45. Block, Mahoney & Corbitt, The Impact of Employment-at-Will Judicial Decisions on the
Outcomes of NLRB Representation Elections, 38 INDUS. REL. REs. A. 268 (1986).
46. Neumann & Rissman, supra note 24.
1989]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
III. THE TERMINATION-AT-WILL DOCTRINE
The doctrine of termination-at-will emerged in America in 1877, when a
treatise writer stated:
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is
prima facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a
yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof...
[Otherwise] it is an indefinite hiring and is determinable at the will
of either party .... I
The rule of termination-at-will was quickly adopted by American jurists
and by the beginning of the 20th century it had become the prevailing law
governing the right to discharge. According to judicial interpretation, the
termination-at-will doctrine presumed that all employment contracts, ab-
sent an explicit provision to the contrary, were for an indefinite length of
time and could therefore be terminated by either party at any time and
without any notice.4"
The newly developed American rule concerning termination of employ-
ment embodied the dominant belief in freedom of contract. Under a free-
dom of contract theory, parties freely entering into a contract were free to
fix the terms of that contract, including the terms and conditions of employ-
ment. The legal system would function to enforce such contracts but would
not, generally speaking, determine the terms and conditions thereof. This
theory of freedom of contract was thought to result in the most efficient
allocation of property and resources; the allocation would inure to the gen-
eral benefit of society. Further, freedom of contract allowed individuals to
determine their own needs and interests and to control their own lives. Fi-
nally, freedom of contract limited the involvement of the judicial system to
interpretation of contract terms, rather than substantive determination of
the agreement.49
Although the termination-at-will doctrine remains the general rule, a
number of exceptions to this rule have been created during the last 100
years. These exceptions have included constitutional protections for public
sector employees, statutory exceptions, and most recently, a host of judi-
cially-created exceptions.
47. 2 H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 136, at 283 (1886).
Wood's first edition was published in 1877.
48. Essentially, this reflects the doctrine of mutuality. See A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CON-
TRACTS § 152 (1950 & Supp. 1984); see also Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 174-75 (1908).
49. F. KESSLER & M. SHARP, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 4-5 (1953).
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A. Constitutional Protection
For public sector employees, constitutional guarantees provide some
protection against unjust dismissal. Notably, the first amendment guaran-
tees of freedom of speech, association, and belief support a limit on eni-
ployer discharge.5 0 Unlike employees in the private sector, government
employees are protected, at least to some degree, in their right to speak out
on matters that may be contrary to the government employer's policies.51
Public sector employees are also afforded procedural protection by the
provisions of the fifth and fourteenth amendments' guarantees of due pro-
cess.52 Although not entitled to a full adjudicatory hearing, public sector
employees must receive notice and an opportunity to be heard before they
can be discharged.53 The constitutional protections have been generally in-
sured by statutory enactments such as the Civil Service Reform Act.5
B. Statutory Protection
There are several types of federal and state statutes that limit termina-
tion-at-will by precluding discharge based on various factors. For instance,
many state and local governments have enacted legislation that prohibits
discrimination in any aspect of employment, including termination on the
basis of race, sex, national origin, age or creed.55 In 1964, Congress pro-
vided similar protection on the federal level in Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act.5
6
In addition to Title VII and similar state statutes, there are many other
types of statutory protections against unjust dismissal. For example, stat-
utes protect employees against retaliation for filing a claim under the Fair
Labor Standards Act ("FLSA")57 and the OSH Act. 8 Similarly, the Safe
Drinking Water Act5 9 protects workers who report employer violations.
The Consumer Credit Protection Act prohibits the discharge of employees
50. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
51. See Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977); Pickering v. Board of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
52. U.S. CONST. amends. V and XIV, § 1.
53. See H. KAPLAN, THE LAW OF CIVIL SERVICE 225 (1958); Comment, Substantive Due
Process: The Extent of Public Employees' Protection from Arbitrary Dismissal, 122 W. VA. L.
REV. 16 (1974).
54. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (1978).
55. See Bonfield, The Substance of American Fair Employment Practices Legislation L" Em-
ployers, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 907 passim (1967).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
57. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1986).
58. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1982).
59. Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300 j-q(i)(10) (1982).
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based on the grounds that their wages are being garnished for a single
indebtedness.6"
Furthermore, several states have laws prohibiting the discharge of an
employee for refusal to take a lie detector test.61 Some states prohibit dis-
charge based on an employee's jury service or indication of a willingness to
serve on a jury panel.62 At least thirty-five municipalities have passed ordi-
nances that prohibit discrimination against employees because of their sex-
ual preference. 63 Five states have passed legislation or amended existing
legislation to protect employees from employer retaliation for the employee
reporting a violation of a law or participation in an enforcement proceed-
ing.' Under Michigan's Whistleblower's Protection Act, an employer may
not discharge, threaten, or otherwise discriminate against an employee in
matters of salary, benefits, privileges, or location of employment based on
the employee's perceived status as a whistleblower.65
To date there is considerable variance among the states concerning stat-
utory provisions for exceptions to termination-at-will; however, some con-
sideration is currently being given to minimizing that variance. On July 15,
1988, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
60. 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a)-(b) (1982).
61. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51G (West 1987); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-26.5 (1985);
IDAHO CODE § 44-903 (1977); MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, § 95 (1985); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 37.201-37.208 (West 1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:40A-1 (West 1987); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 659.225 (1987); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7321 (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN. LAW §§ 28-6.1-1 to -
6.1-3 (1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 49.44.120, 49.44.130 (West Supp. 1989).
62. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 2-218 (1979); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.1348 (West
1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27.09.1-17 (1985).
63. J. STIEBER & J. BLACKBURN, PROTECTING UNORGANIZED EMPLOYEES AGAINST UN-
JUST DISCHARGE 26 (1983).
64. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5 (West Supp. 1989) (protecting both public and pri-
vate employees when making a disclosure to government or law enforcement agency); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-6ldd(a) (West 1979) (applying to public employees only); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 30:2027 (West 1989) (protecting both private and public employees when reporting envi-
ronmental violations); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42:1169 (West Supp. 1989) (applying to public
employees only); MD. ANN. CODE art. 64, § 12(G) (1988) (applying to public employees only).
65. Whistleblowers' Protection Act, Act 469, 1980, March 31, 1981 (codified at MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 15.361-15.369 (West 1981)). Other laws which protect against unjust dis-
missal do so on the basis of the nature of the employee to be protected. For instance, honorably
discharged military veterans are, upon discharge from the service, entitled to return to the same
jobs which they held before they entered the service. These veterans may not, except for cause, be
discharged from the jobs to which they return for a period of one year. Veteran's Preference Act
of 1944 and Vietnam Era Veteran's Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974, 38 U.S.C.§§ 2021-2026
(1982). "Cause" has been defined by courts to encompass "such cause as a fair-minded person
may act upon .... ." Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal. Time for a Stat-
ute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 497 (1976) (citing Keserich v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp., 163 F.2d
889, 890 (7th Cir. 1947)).
TERMINATION-AT- WILL DOCTRINE
released a draft of the Employment Termination Act.6 In its tentative
form, this Act recognizes three exceptions currently recognized by some
state legislatures and various state courts. This uniform law would prohibit
a termination that (1) contradicts clearly expressed public policy; (2) is
based upon the employee reporting certain facts that he or she was legally
bound to report or is based upon the employee's failure to report facts that
would harm other employees or the general public; or (3) violates the em-
ployer's own policies (implied contract) or is not based on good faith.67
This Act appears to be an attempt to create consistency with respect to the
treatment of the termination-at-will issue and enables both employers and
employees to anticipate what would constitute exceptions to the rule. The
reporter's comments suggest that no decision has been made about the ex-
tent to which employees covered by collective bargaining agreements will be
affected by this Act.68 The reporter's notations suggest that there is some
sentiment among the commissioners to include unionized employees only
under the public policy exception.6 9 Apparently, there is also some consid-
ertion to include a provision that creates a presumption that any employee
covered by this Act, who has been employed for more than one year, could
not be fired without "just cause." 70
C. Unions and Termination-at-Will
One of the first statutes to offer the employee some protection against
arbitrary action by the employer was the National Labor Relations Act of
1935 ("NLRA").71 The NLRA, in Section 8(a)(3), forbids the discharge of
an employee based upon the employee's union activity.72 Employees
66. Draft of Employment Termination Act Prepared for Discussion by Drafting Committee of
Nat'l Conf of Comm'rs on Uniform State Laws, [July] Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 161, at D-1
(Aug. 19, 1988).
67. Id. at D-1 and D-2.
68. Id. at D-2.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
72. Section 8(a) states:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . .(3) by discrimination in regard to
hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organizations: Provided, that nothing in this sub-
chapter, or in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from
making an agreement with a labor organization (not established, maintained, or assisted by
any action defined in this subsection as an unfair labor practice) to require as a condition of
employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of
such employment or the effective date of such agreement, whichever is the later, (i) if such
labor organization is the representative of the employees as provided in section 159(a) of
this title, in the appropriate collective-bargaining unit covered by such agreement when
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wrongfully discharged may, under the provisions of the NLRA, be rein-
stated. Since such actions are enforced through the NLRB, employees nor-
mally bear no cost in prosecuting their claims.73 Notably, however, the
protection provided by the NLRA is limited to discharge based on an em-
ployee's participation in union activity and does not limit the employer's
freedom to terminate employees for other reasons.74
In addition to the protection against unlawful discharge for union activ-
ity, the NLRA provided the legal impetus for the development and growth
of collective bargaining. Although individual employees may possess rela-
tively little bargaining power with employers, groups of individuals acting
in concert, as through labor unions, are able to effect a substantially greater
bargaining advantage. The inequality in bargaining power contributed to
the rise of labor unions which, as one of their major tenets, fought to limit
the powers of employers to terminate the employment relationship on an at-
will basis.75 Relying on the Taft-Hartley Act, private sector unions used
collective bargaining agreements to limit the employer's ability to terminate
only to those cases where "just cause" was present. The protection of em-
ployees from unjust discharge continues to be one of the major advantages
of union membership: Approximately 90% of all collective bargaining
agreements include language which prohibits dismissal "without cause" or
"without just cause" and even where such language is not explicitly stated,
arbitrators tend to imply such a condition.76
made, and (ii) unless following an election held as provided in section 159(e) of this title
within one year preceding the effective date of such agreement, the Board shall have certi-
fied that at least a majority of the employees eligible to vote in such election have voted to
rescind the authority of such labor organization to make such an agreement: Provided
further, that no employer shall justify any discrimination against any employee for non-
membership in a labor organization (A) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that
such membership was not available to the employee on the same terms and conditions
generally applicable to other members, or (B) if he has reasonable grounds for believing
that membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of the em-
ployee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition
of acquiring or retaining membership ....
29 U.S.C. § 158.
73. In one year the NLRB ordered reinstatement for 5407 terminated workers and back pay
wages totaling $5.9 million to be paid to 6758 workers. See Summers, supra note 65, at 492 (citing
38 NLRB ANN. REP. 13-14 (1973)).
74. Zimmerman & Howard-Martin, The National Labor Relations Act and Employment-at-
Will: The Federal Preemption Doctrine Revisited, 37 LAB. L.J., 223, 233-34 (1986).
75. R. ALLEN & T. KEAVENY, CONTEMPORARY LABOR RELATIONS 158-59 (1983).
76. Summers, Protecting All Employees Against Unjust Dismissal, HARV. Bus. REV. 132, 136,
(Jan.-Feb. 1980); Zimmerman & Howard-Martin, supra note 74, at 227.
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D. Judicial Exceptions
Several theories have been used by the courts to carve out exceptions to
the termination-at-will doctrine: implied contract, tort action, and implied
covenant of good faith.77 Under the implied contract theory, a court relies
on the construction of the conversation between the parties, for example in
an interview, or in written words, including employee handbooks. Under
this theory, a court may find that, on the basis of the evidence presented,
there was an implied promise that there would be no discharge without just
cause. For example, in a Michigan case, Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Michigan,78 involving a preemployment query, plaintiff was told
that he would not be discharged as long as he did his job. In its decision,
the Michigan court stated:
An employer who establishes no personnel policies instills no rea-
sonable expectations of performance. Employers can make known
to their employees that personnel policies are subject to unilateral
changes by the employer. Employees would then have no legitimate
expectation that any particular policy will continue to remain in
77. For a further discussion of the judicial exceptions to the termination-at-will doctrine, see
L. LARSON & P. BOROWSKY, UNJUST DISMISSAL (1989); Abrams & Nolan, Toward a Theory of
"Just Cause" in Employee Discipline Cases, 1985 DUKE L.J. 594; Bastress, A Synthesis and a
Proposal for Reform of the Employment At-WillDoctrine, 90 W. VA. L. REv. 319 (1988); Baxter &
Wohl, A Special Update: Wrongful Termination Tort Claims, 11 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 124
(1985); Blackburn, Restricted Employer Discharge Rights: A Changing Concept of Employment at
Will, 17 AM. Bus. L.J. 467 (1980); Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Lim-
iting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1404 (1967); Blumrosen, Stran-
gers No More: All Workers Are Entitled to 'Just Cause' Protection Under Title VII, 2 INDUS. REL.
L.J. 519 (1978); Gillette, The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing: Are Employers
the Insurers of the Eighties?, 11 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 438 (1985); Hermann & Sor, Property Rights
in One's Job: The Case for Limiting Employment-at-Will, 24 ARiz. L. REv. 763 (1982); Jenkins,
Federal Legislative Exceptions to the At-Will Doctrine: Proposed Statutory Protection for Dis-
charges Violative of Public Policy, 47 ALB. L. REv. 466 (1983); Krauskopf, Employment Dis-
charge: Survey and Critique of the Modern Employment At Will Rule, 51 U. MO.-KAN. CITY L.
REv. 189 (1983); Lansing & Pegnetter, Fair Dismissal Procedures for Non-Union Employees, 20
AM. Bus. L.J. 75 (1982); Mallor, Discriminatory Discharge and the Emerging Common Law of
Wrongful Discharge, 28 ARIZ. L. REv. 651 (1986); Marrinan, Employment-At-Will: Pandora's
Box May Have an Attractive Cover, 7 HAMLINE L. REv. 155 (1984); Mennemeier, Protection From
Unjust Discharges: An Arbitration Scheme, 19 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 49 (1982); Murg & Scharman,
Employment At Will: Do The Exceptions Overwhelm the Rule?, 23 B.C.L. REv. 329 (1982); Peck,
Unjust Discharges from Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1979);
Peirce, Mann & Roberts, Employee Termination at Will: A Principled Approach, 28 VILL. L.
REv. 1 (1982); Platt, Rethinking the Right of Employers to Terminate At-Will Employees, 15 J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 633 (1982); Steiber & Murray, Protection Against Unjust Discharge: The
Need for a Federal Statute, 16 J. OF L. REF. 319, 333-34 (1983); Summers, The Contract of Em-
ployment and the Rights of Individual Employees: Fair Representation and Employment at Will,
52 FORDHAM L. REv. 1082 (1984); Summers, supra note 65.
78. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
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force. Employees could, however, legitimately expect that policies
in force at any given time will be uniformly applied to all. If there is
in effect a policy to dismiss for cause only, the employer may not
depart from that policy at whim simply because he was under no
obligation to institute the policy in the first place. Having an-
nounced the policy, presumably with a view to obtaining the benefit
of improved employee attitudes and behavior and improved quality
of the work force, the employer may not treat its promises as
illusory.79
Much of the tort theory relies on a wrongful or retaliatory discharge
concept, in which courts often cite to some public policy that would be
undermined by allowing termination. The public policy argument suggests
that there are circumstances under which the employer's motive for dis-
charging an employee harms or interferes with an important interest of the
community and therefore justifies awarding compensation to the em-
ployee.8 0 The principle factors that courts utilize in assessing public policy
are formal expressions and manifestations of public policy in the mandates,
norms, and guidelines declared in federal and state constitutions, statutes,
judicial decisions, and the variety of other avenues by which the official
decisions and actions of organized society are registered."1 Under the pub-
lic policy exception, individuals who are discharged for a reason in opposi-
tion to public policy, such as serving on a jury82 or filing a worker's
compensation claim, 3 can obtain relief from the courts.8 4
Finally, a few courts have found that a termination of employment rep-
resents a breach of an implied covenant of good faith in the employment
contract. Utilizing this theory, courts have held that termination of em-
79. Id. at 619, 292 N.W.2d at 894-95.
80. The first case to establish the public policy exception was the California case, Petermann
v. International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959), which
held that public policy was violated when the plaintiff employee was discharged by his employer
for refusing to give perjured testimony before a committee of the legislature.
81. Id. See generally Note, Guidelines for a Public Policy Exception to the Employment at
Will Rule: The Wrongful Discharge Tort, 13 CONN. L. REV. 617 (1981).
82. Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).
83. Hansen v. Harrah's, 100 Nev. 60, 675 P.2d 394 (1984).
84. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d
1330 (1980) (employee discharged for refusing to engage in illegal price fixing); Sheets v. Teddy's
Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980) (employee discharged for insisting em-
ployer comply with state labeling regulations); Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d
124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981) (employee discharged for giving police information to be used against
a fellow employee); Delaney v. Taco Time Int'l, 297 Or. 10, 681 P.2d 114 (1984) (employee dis-
charged for refusing to sign a false and arguably tortious statement concerning the behavior of a
former employee).
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ployment must occur absent bad faith or malice." In Cleary v. American
Airlines, Inc.,6 the California Court of Appeals wrote that "'[t]here is an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract that
neither party will do anything which will injure the right of the other to
receive the benefits of the agreement.' ,,' Similarly, the New Hampshire
Supreme Court held that "a termination by the employer of a contract of
employment at will which is motivated by bad faith or malice or based on
retaliation is not [in] the best interest of the economic system or the public
good and constitutes a breach of the employment contract."88
IV. THE EFFECT OF JUDICIAL EXCEPTIONS TO THE TERMINATION-AT-
WILL DOCTRINE ON UNIONS
As the courts and legislatures continue to erode the termination-at-will
doctrine by expanding the number and scope of exceptions thereto, the ef-
fects of this change on organized labor remain unclear. Neumann and Riss-
man argued that by making third party (i.e., judicial) review of personnel
decisions available to nonunion employees, the implied contract exception
"seems to strike at the heart of the services provided by unions."89 But in
fact, the breadth of protection against unjust discharge differs substantially
between that provided by unionization and by the courts. Exceptions to the
termination-at-will doctrine tend to be very narrow and have, to date, been
extended primarily to professional and managerial (i.e., typically non-
union) employees. The cost of protection against discrimination or unjust
discharge in the union sector consists of union dues; protection through the
courts means that employees must retain an attorney. In addition, enforce-
ment through grievance-arbitration in the union sector is, at least on the
average, more expeditious than filing suit. Remedies also differ in poten-
tially important ways, with courts often awarding monetary damages in lieu
of reinstatement with backpay.
Arguably, although legal protections are likely to be imperfect substi-
tutes for union protections, employees may view them as adequate substi-
tutes. They may, for example, over-estimate the level of legal protection
available to nonunion workers. Alternatively, employees may believe that
85. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974), modified, Howard v.
Dorr Woolen Co., 120 N.H. 295, 414 A.2d 1273 (1980).
86. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
87. Id. at 453, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 728 (citing Comunal v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d
654, 658, 328 P.2d 198, 200 (1958) (emphasis added by Cleary court)).
88. Monge, 114 N.H. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551 (citing Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260
Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973)).
89. Neumann & Rissman, supra note 24, at 188.
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the additional protections unions provide do not outweigh the cost of union
dues. 90
Whether employees believe that judicial exceptions to the termination-
at-will doctrine adequately substitute for union protections is an empirical
question. In their study, Neumann and Rissman found that union member-
ship was significantly lower and declined faster in the states in which the
judiciary had recognized implied contract exceptions to the termination-at-
will doctrine. 9' They interpret this result as supporting the union substitu-
tion hypothesis. Because of the potentially important implications of such a
finding and the existence of several shortcomings in the Neumann and Riss-
man study, our study seeks to correct those problems and re-estimate the
impact of several exceptions to the termination-at-will doctrine on the pri-
mary source of union growth.
Again, the central premise of the union substitution hypothesis is that
the provision of legal protections to nonunion employees reduces employee
demand for union representation. To test whether termination-at-will ex-
ceptions exert such a substitution effect requires estimating the effect of
these exceptions on a measure which captures employee demand for union
representation. Neumann and Rissman tested this hypothesis by estimating
the effect of termination-at-will restrictions on total union membership. 92
This is a serious limitation because a leading study of the causes of union
membership decline concluded that economic factors have been the largest
single cause of the decline in total union membership; the primary eco-
nomic factor being slower employment growth in previously organized
plants. 93 Employment decline in previously organized workplaces is en-
tirely unrelated to employee demand for union services. Similarly, there is
no precise relationship between employment growth in previously organ-
ized workplaces and union membership, due to the tied sale of employment
and membership in union shops, and the existence of "free-riders" in right-
to-work states.
94
To remedy this limitation of the Neumann and Rissman study, we esti-
mate the effect of termination-at-will restrictions on the primary source of
new union members in the private sector: The number of employees for
whom representation rights are won via NLRB certification elections in
90. Forbes & Jones, supra note 44.
91. Neumann & Rissman, supra note 24.
92. Id.
93. Dickens & Leonard, Accountingfor the Decline in Union Membership, 1950-1980, 38 IN-
DUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 323 (1985).
94. Farber & Saks, Why Workers Want Unions: The Role of Relative Wages and Job Charac-
teristics, 88 J. POL. ECON. 349-50 (1980).
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percent of nonunion employment ("UNIONFLOW"). UNIONFLOW
omits changes in union membership due to employment change in previ-
ously organized workplaces, because such change is unrelated to employee
demand for union services. Employee demand is a major determinant of
UNIONFLOW, as it is based on majority vote in elections to determine
whether employees favor union representation at their workplace. 95
We also estimate the effect of the termination-at-will exceptions on the
number of employees for whom representation rights are sought, in percent
of nonunion employment ("ORGEFF"). Unions must continually organize
workers in order to replace members lost through employment declines in
previously organized workplaces. As indicated by the data in Table 1, on
the next page, dramatic declines in union organizing effort (column 3) have
also contributed to the decline in total union membership.
A second limitation of the Neumann and Rissman study concerns their
definition and categorization of the judicial decisions regarding termination-
at-will. They relied exclusively on a secondary source, the Bureau of Na-
tional Affairs ("BNA"), in order to determine the states in which excep-
tions to the termination-at-will doctrine had been recognized. Perhaps as a
consequence of this reliance, they coded several states as having exceptions
which, according to our reading of the actual cases, do not belong in this
category. Moreover, the BNA categorization of implied contract cases was
overly general for the purpose of testing the government substitution
hypothesis.
The coding scheme developed in this Article, for judicially recognized
exceptions to the termination-at-will doctrine, attempts to reflect the com-
plexity and nuances of the various judicial decisions.96 Cases were first cat-
95. Nonetheless, the NLRB data is subject to some limitations. It omits the flow into the
union sector via the Railway Labor Act ("RLA") and public sector bargaining laws. However,
the RLA is a relatively minor source of union growth. Public sector union growth appears to be
subject to very different dynamics than the private sector, and public employees have greater
nonunion protections than private sector employees via Civil Service laws. Thus, the latter omis-
sion may be advantageous for our purpose. NLRB data also ignores the reduction of the flow of
successfully organized workers due to the high rate (25%) of failure to negotiate first contracts.
See Cooke, The Failure to Negotiate First Contracts: Determinants and Policy Implications, 38
INDUS. & LAB. REL. Rnv. 163 (1985). While a potentially important source of union decline,
failed contract negotiations operate independently of employee demand for union representation
by definition, since they change the union status of workers who have expressed a desire for repre-
sentation. Our estimates relate to causes of union decline which operate on employee demand,
and are not meant to be strictly comparable to those which focus on net changes in total union
membership.
96. Because union election data are not available from the NLRB Annual Reports after 1983,
the authors did not use cases decided after 1982. The authors lagged the termination-at-will vari-
ables one year to allow knowledge of the judicially-created exceptions to filter down to the public
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TABLE 1
Number of
Elections
Year Held
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
7,748
7,820
8,170
8,675
9,091
8,631
8,387
8,491
9,292
8,093
7,905
8,049
7,391
5,041
4,361
Number of
Employees
for Whom
Rep. Sought
577,408
589,252
573,946
571,694
519,286
524,894
553,546
465,586
553,740
461,335
562,069
509,971
439,085
293,095
206,120
Annual Reports of the National Labor Relations Board
egorized as falling under the implied contract, tort or implied covenant of
good faith exception. 7
and therefore potentially affect their decisions about union membership. A number of state courts
did recognize exceptions to the termination-at-will doctrine for the first time after 1982.
97. The cases categorized under implied contract are: Forman v. BRI Corp., 532 F. Supp. 49
(E.D. Pa. 1982); Wagner v. Sperry Univac, 458 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Foley v. Commu-
nity Oil Co., Inc., 64 F.R.D. 561 (D. N.H. 1974); Scott v. Lane, 409 So. 2d 791 (Ala. 1982);
Rabago-Alvarez v. Dart Indus., 55 Cal. App. 3d 91, 127 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1976); Magnan v. Ana-
conda Indus., 37 Conn. Supp. 38, 429 A.2d 429 (1980); McClure v. Leasco Computer, Inc., 134
Ga. App. 871, 216 S.E.2d 689 (1975); Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 563
P.2d 54 (1977); Carter v. Kaskaskia Community Action Agency, 24 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 322 N.E.2d
574 (1974); Johnston v. Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co., 218 Kan. 543, 545 P.2d 312 (1976);
Terrio v. Millinocket Community Hosp., 379 A.2d 135 (Me. 1977); Garrity v. Valley View Nurs-
ing Home, Inc., 10 Mass. App. Ct. 822, 406 N.E.2d 423 (1980); Fortune v. National Cash Regis-
ter Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich.
579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980); Sinnett v. Hie Food Prods., Inc., 185 Neb. 221, 174 N.W.2d 720
(1970); Forrester v. Parker, 93 N.M. 781, 606 P.2d 191 (1980); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57
N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441 (1982); Sabin v. Williamette-Western Corp., 276 Or. 1083, 557 P.2d
1344 (1976); School Comm. of Providence v. Board of Regents for Educ., 112 R.I. 288, 308 A.2d
788 (1973); Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. O'Neal, 224 Va. 343, 297 S.E.2d 647 (1982); Roberts v. Atlan-
tic Richfield Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887, 568 P.2d 764 (1977).
The cases categorized under tort are: Smith v. Atlas Off-Shore Boat Serv., Inc., 653 F.2d 1057
(5th Cir. 1981); Larson v. Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907 (Ct. App. 1977);
Number of
Employees
for Whom
Rep. Won
292,526
308,167
269,068
286,436
224,121
194,115
209,876
167,172
198,018
171,752
202,311
190,408
162,399
100,325
90,340
Election
Win Rate
(Percent)
54.3
55.2
53.0
53.5
50.9
49.7
48.0
48.0
45.8
45.8
44.8
45.6
42.8
39.9
42.9
Average
Unit Size
74.5
75.3
70.2
65.9
57.1
60.8
66.0
54.8
59.6
57.0
71.1
63.3
59.4
58.1
47.3
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The cases were further classified either as narrow, broad, limited or not
termination. The narrowest definition of an exception to the termination-
at-will doctrine used only those cases in which an exception was explicitly
recognized by the state's highest court and the case concerned the termina-
tion of an employee's job.98 These cases reflect decisions that clearly recog-
nize an exception to the termination-at-will doctrine and set precedent in
the state.
The next definition (broad) for all exceptions was extended to include
cases that were decided by an intermediate state appellate court or a federal
M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 596 S.W.2d 681 (1980); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980); Petermann v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959); Lampe v. Presbyterian Medical
Center, 41 Colo. App. 465, 590 P.2d 513 (1978); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn.
471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980); Beavers v. Johnson, 112 Ga. App. 677, 145 S.E.2d 776 (1965); Parnar
v. American Hotels, Inc., 65 Haw. 370, 652 P.2d 625 (1982); Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation
Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54 (1977); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Iln. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353
(1978); Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Johnston v.
Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co., 218 Kan. 543, 545 P.2d 312 (1976); Pan-Mutual Clerks' Union
of Ky., Local 541 v. Kentucky Jockey Club, 551 S.W.2d 801 (Ky. 1977); Adler v. American
Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981); Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140,
355 N.E.2d 315 (1976); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976);
Keneally v. Orgain, 186 Mont. 1, 606 P.2d 127 (1980); Cloutier v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
Co., 121 N.H. 915, 436 A.2d 1140 (1981); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417
A.2d 505 (1980); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975); Geary v. United States Steel
Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974); Branham v. Miller Elec. Co., 237 S.C. 540, 118 S.E.2d
167 (1961); Sea-Land, 224 Va. 343, 297 S.E.2d 647.
The cases categorized under implied covenant of good faith are: Mitford v. LaSala, 666 P.2d
1000 (Ark. 1983); Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722
(1980); Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., 193 Conn. 558, 479 A.2d 781 (1984); Fortune, 373 Mass. 96,
364 N.E.2d 1251; Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 196 Mont. 178, 638 P.2d 1063 (1982); Monge v.
Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974); Hall v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 713 P.2d 1027
(Ok. 1985).
98. The implied contract cases in this category are: Magnan, 193 Conn. 558, 479 A.2d 781;
Jackson, 98 Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54; Terrio, 379 A.2d 135 (Me. 1977); Toussaint, 408 Mich. 579,
292 N.W.2d 880; Forrester, 93 N.M. 781, 606 P.2d 191; Weiner, 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441;
Sabin, 276 Or. 1083, 557 P.2d 1344.
The tort cases in this category are: Tameny, 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr.
839; Sheets, 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385; Parner, 65 Haw. 370, 652 P.2d 625; Kelsay, 74 Ill. 2d
172, 384 N.E.2d 353; Frampton, 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425; Pari-Mutual Clerks' Union, 551
S.W.2d 801; Agis, 371 Mass. 140, 355 N.E.2d 315; Cloutier, 121 N.H. 915, 436 A.2d 1140; Nees,
272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512; Sea-Land, 224 Va. 343, 297 S.E.2d 647; Harless v. First Nat'l Bank in
Fairmont, 162 W. Va. 116, 246 S.E.2d 270 (1978).
The implied covenant of good faith cases in this category are: Cleary, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443,
168 Cal. Rptr. 722; Magnan, 193 Conn. 558, 479 A.2d 781; Gates, 196 Mont. 178, 638 P.2d 1063;
Monge, 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549.
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court, or where a court which indicated its willingness to find an exception
in the future, but declined to do so in the instant case.99
The third definition (limited) included cases in which an exception was
recognized, but in a limited fashion."° For example, in some cases the
court conditioned its finding of an implied contract upon the existence of a
stated or clear duration of employment and in others insisted upon a show-
ing of detrimental reliance.' 0 '
The final and broadest definition (not termination) included employ-
ment cases in which the court recognized an implied contract, but the in-
jury was not the termination of employment per se, but rather, for example,
failure to pay a bonus.10 2 These cases were coded separately because they
did not directly deal with, address, nor give a remedy specifically for termi-
nation-at-will based on the facts or the relief sought. An example of a case
in this category is one in which a court recognized an implied contract
promising a bonus, but declined to extend the implied contract to create an
exception to the policy of termination-at-will. 103
Judicially recognized exceptions to the termination-at-will doctrine can
reduce employee demand for union representation by persuading nonunion
employees that these decisions provide sufficient protection from unjust dis-
charge without union representation. To test whether these decisions have
actually had this effect, it is necessary to determine which judicial decisions
employees are aware of and which decisions are assumed to provide suffi-
cient protection.
99. The implied contract cases in this category are: Forman, 532 F. Supp. 49; Scholtes v.
Signal Delivery Serv., Inc., 548 F. Supp. 487 (W.D. Ark. 1982); Rabago-Alvarez, 55 Cal. App. 3d
91, 127 Cal. Rptr. 222; McClure, 134 Ga. App. 871, 216 S.E.2d 689; Carter, 24 Ill. App. 3d 1056,
322 N.E.2d 574; Johnston, 218 Kan. 543, 545 P.2d 312; Garrity, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 822, 406
N.E.2d 423; Hedrick v. Center for Comprehensive Alcoholism Treatment, 7 Ohio App. 3d 211,
454 N.E.2d 1343 (1982); School Comm. of Providence, 112 R.I. 288, 308 A.2d 788.
The tort cases in this category are: Smith, 653 F.2d 1057; Larson, 117 Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d
907; M.B.M. Co., 268 Ark. 269, 596 S.W.2d 681; Petermann, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25;
Lampe, 41 Colo. App. 465, 590 P.2d 513; Beavers, 112 Ga. App. 677, 145 S.E.2d 776; Jackson, 98
Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54; Johnston, 218 Kan. 543, 545 P.2d 312; Adler, 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464;
Sventko, 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151; Keneally, 186 Mont. 1, 606 P.2d 127; Pierce, 84
N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505; Geary, 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174; Branham, 237 S.C. 540, 118 S.E.2d 167.
100. Five cases of implied contract fit this category: Foley v. Community Oil Co., 64 F.R.D.
561 (D. N.H. 1974); Scott v. Lane, 409 So. 2d 791 (Ala. 1982); Fortune, 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d
1251; Sea-Land, 224 Va. 343, 297 S.E.2d 647; Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Wash. 2d
887, 568 P.2d 764 (1977).
101. See, e.g., Sea-Land, 224 Va. 343, 297 S.E.2d 647.
102. Two cases of implied contract fit this category: Wagner v. Sperry Univac, 458 F. Supp.
505 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Sinnett v. Hie Food Prod., Inc., 185 Neb. 221, 174 N.W.2d 720 (1970).
103. Sinnett, 185 Neb. 221, 174 N.W.2d 720.
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Of course, it is not possible to know with any degree of certainty
whether or not employees are aware of any particular court decisions. At
the state level, the focus is on cases decided at the appellate levels, in part
because only state supreme court decisions absolutely set precedent in all
states and, as a general rule, only state appellate decisions are published.
Clearly, the media does not limit reporting to appellate decisions. It is pos-
sible that the lay public would be aware of trial court decisions and may not
be aware that such decisions can be appealed. Certainly, the public may not
follow a case to find out if the initial decision is affirmed on appeal. More-
over, although we have taken care to code decisions based on the level and
type of court that rendered the decision, and the breadth of the exception
that was created, it is unlikely that the lay public would make such sophisti-
cated distinctions. Since we cannot determine, a priori, which decisions in-
fluence employee perceptions, we empirically test the effect of all the
alternative definitions of termination-at-will restrictions. This procedure al-
lows us to determine whether our conclusions are sensitive to the definition
used. The more robust the results are to differences in definition, the
greater the confidence we can place in these results.
A. The Model
The primary data source for this study is the Annual Reports of the
NLRB. Two dependent variables are used: the number of employees for
whom union representation rights are won, in percent of nonunion employ-
ment ("UNIONFLOW"); and the number of employees for whom repre-
sentation rights are sought by unions, in percent of nonunion employment("ORGEFF"). 'o4
As noted earlier in this Article, scholars have suggested several causes
for the declining level of unionization. In addition to union substitution by
government, these causes include employer suppression, structural changes
in the economy, ideology, and values. Since these causes coincided with
increasing judicial restrictions on termination-at-will, their effects must also
be controlled.
The employer suppression hypothesis asserts that increasing legal and
illegal employer resistance to union organizing has been a major cause of
union decline. To test this hypothesis, the number of unfair labor practice
104. Although intuitively it is most appropriate to gauge union organizing efforts relative to
nonunion employment, this method can be criticized for creating a definitional relationship be-
tween the dependent variable and one of the independent variables, namely union membership.
When the model is re-estimated using organizing effort relative to total employment, the union
membership coefficient is no longer statistically significant. All other estimated coefficients and
the R' are invariant with respect to which dependent variable is used.
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charges filed against employers in each state, in each year, are included in
the analysis, in addition to the percentage of employees eligible to vote in
elections ("8ACHARGE"). 8ACHARGE represents the increased cost to
employees engaging in union activity as well as increasing levels of em-
ployer suppression of unions.
The structural change hypothesis maintains that union decline is the
result of the shrinkage of the "unionizable" (i.e., manufacturing, blue col-
lar) sector relative to service and white collar employment. The percentage
of a state's total employment accounted for by manufacturing industries
("%MFG") is included as an indicator of economic structure.
Another hypothesized source of union decline concerns ideology and
values. Lipset argues that declining public opinion toward unions has been
a major cause of union decline."°5 There are three ways in which attitudes
toward unions can influence union growth or decline. Anti-union attitudes
will directly influence organizing success by reducing the proportion of
workers desiring union representation. These attitudes will also affect
union growth indirectly through their effect on public policy. Finally, by
reducing the probability that unions will win elections, anti-union attitudes
reduce the payoff to unions of attempting to organize and thus the amount
of organizing in which they will invest. In the absence of a means of cap-
turing attitude differences and changes, omitted variables bias and simulta-
neity bias are likely to occur. Thus, it is imperative that these problems be
resolved. One way to control the effect on the analysis of changing public
attitudes toward unions is to include appropriate national opinion poll data.
Thus, in one model specification, we include a variable indicating the differ-
ence between the percentage of respondents who have "a great deal" or
"quite a lot" of confidence in unions and the percentage of respondents who
have the same level of confidence in "big business."
If changing public attitudes toward unions caused a reduction in union
growth and power, the increased protection of individual employees
through court decisions may be a response to, rather than a cause of, union
decline. Failure to control for this possibility will create simultaneity bias.
Several commentators have predicted that continuing union decline will
lead to increased government regulation of the employment relationship. 106
In the context of the present study, it is at least possible that judges may
have been more inclined to recognize exceptions to the termination-at-will
doctrine to provide alternative means of protection against unjust dismissal
105. LIPSET, Labor Unions in the Public Mind, in UNIONS IN TRANSITION 287-322 (S. Lipset
ed. 1986).
106. See, e.g., Aaron, supra note 23.
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as a result of declining union strength. Although we do not ascribe to this
view, we will test for its existence. The time-series dimension of the data is
exploited to test for the direction of causality. Since court decisions cannot
have an effect before they exist, the direction of causation of union decline is
tested by using leading indicators of these decisions. Thus, included in the
model are the variables CONTRACT 5, TORTt5, and GOODFAITH '5,
which equal one beginning five years before these court cases were decided.
A negative and significant coefficient on any of these variables would be
consistent with the proposition that declining unionization precipitated
these court decisions.
Omitted variables bias will also occur if state-to-state differences in atti-
tudes toward unions and/or union political power affect union growth.
Since pooled cross-section time series data are used, and attitudes are ex-
pected to differ systematically across states, the structure of the data can be
exploited to reduce this source of bias. In order to control for cross-state
attitude differences that do not vary over time, unobserved state-specific
effects can be incorporated by estimating a fixed-effects model. Therefore,
forty-nine state dummy variables are included in the estimating equations.
Several variables are included in the model as additional controls in all
analyses. The state's annual average unemployment rate captures the avail-
ability of alternative employment opportunities, and thus the potential cost
of job loss due to employer suppression or successful unionization. The
state's real average manufacturing wage is included to control for income
level. The level of union strength in the state is measured by the percentage
of the state's employees who are union members. Membership is expected
to reflect both union political power in the state and employee perceptions
of union strength and efficacy. Finally, year dummy variables are included
to control for year-specific effects.
The dependent variables, UNIONFLOW and ORGEFF, refer to fiscal
years, while many of the independent variables refer to calendar years. The
independent variables are lagged up to nine months by entering the prior
calendar year's values for the current fiscal year. In other words, union
organizing effort in fiscal 1983 is estimated as a function of 1982 calendar
year values. The court decision variables are also lagged one year. This
reflects the assumption that the lay public's awareness of the existence of
these common law developments, and thus any influence they might have,
occurs with a lag.
B. Results
The estimates reported in columns (1) and (3) in Table 2 utilize the
narrowest definition of judicially recognized exceptions to the termination-
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TABLE 2
REGRESSION ESTIMATESa OF THE EFFECT OF JUDICIALLY RECOGNIZED
EXCEPTIONS TO THE TERMINATION-AT-WILL DOCTRINE ON THE FLOW
OF WORKERS INTO THE UNION SECTOR ("UNIONFLOW") AND UNION
ORGANIZING EFFORT ("ORGEFF"), 1969-1983
1 2 3 4
UNIONFLOW UNIONFLOW ORGEFF ORGEFF
CONTRACTb .15 .05 -. 04 -. 04
(.13) (.09) (.07) (.05)
TORTb .29* .25** -.21* .16*
(.11) (.09) (.06) (.05)
GOODFAITHb - .09 - .06 - .02 .03(.19) (.18) (.11) (.10)
8ACHARGE -. 07** -. 07** -. 08** -. 08**
(.01) (.01) (.00) (.00)
% MFG -. 01 -. 01 -. 01 .01(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Other control variables: unemployment rate, real wage, union
membership, year dummies, state dummies.
R2 .67 .67 .81 .81
N 690 690 690 690
Standard errors in parentheses.
b Estimates in columns I and 3 are based on the narrowest definition of termination-at-will
exceptions. Columns 2 and 4 are based on the broadest definition.
** Significant at .01 level.
* Significant at .05 level.
at-will doctrine. That is, these variables reflect decisions of the state's high-
est court, that clearly recognized an exception, and involved termination.
The estimates in columns (2) and (4) utilize the broadest definition of judi-
cial exceptions, the "not termination" definition. The estimates in columns
(1) and (2) of Table 2 report the determinants of the flow of workers into
the union sector; columns (3) and (4) report those for union organizing
effort. All models reported in Table 2 include controls for unobserved
state-specific effects, but do not include the variable capturing public opin-
ion poll data on attitudes toward unions.
The union substitution hypothesis implies that judicially recognized ex-
ceptions to the termination-at-will doctrine reduce non-union employees'
demands for union representation, i.e., negative coefficients of these vari-
ables would support the union substitution hypothesis. The estimates re-
ported in Table 2 provide no support for this hypothesis. Indeed, with all
other factors being equal, recognition of the tort of wrongful discharge sig-
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nificantly increases both the flow of workers into the union sector and union
organizing effort. The signs and significance of the termination-at-will coef-
ficients are very robust as compared to alternative definitions of these excep-
tions. The results obtained when using the intermediate definitions (not
reported) are virtually identical to those which are reported. These results
suggest that protections of nonunion employees may encourage unions to
organize the unorganized and encourage individuals to vote for union rep-
resentation. This might occur if recognition of the tort of wrongful dis-
charge is viewed as providing some protection from the consequences of
employer retaliation during union organizing campaigns.
Alternative interpretations of these results are also possible. For exam-
ple, the failure to find a negative effect of any exceptions of the termination-
at-will doctrine may reflect a tendency of unions to organize only where the
effect of termination-at-will exceptions is weakest. Without specific hypoth-
eses identifying which employee groups are least affected by these decisions,
it is not possible to directly test for this possibility. Nonetheless, the results
do not support the union substitution hypothesis, via judicial exceptions to
termination-at-will.
It is important to control for increasing management resistance to
unionization, since it increases the cost to employees of advocating unioni-
zation and is expected to be serially correlated with the expanding protec-
tions of nonunion employees. As expected, illegal employer resistance, as
measured by employer unfair labor practices, significantly reduces both the
flow of workers into the union sector and union organizing effort.
In another specification, we included a variable reflecting public atti-
tudes toward unions. Use of this variable necessitates a restriction on the
time period examined: Only odd years beginning in 1973 are used. These
results are not reported, but are available from the authors on request.
Controlling directly for changing public attitudes toward unions does not
alter our conclusion that judicial restrictions on the termination-at-will doc-
trine have not contributed to union decline. Similarly, our test for simulta-
neity between union decline and recognition of exceptions to the
termination-at-will doctrine, via leading indicators of these decisions, sug-
gests that these judicial exceptions did not occur as a consequence, or fol-
low after, union decline in the state. These results are also not reported, but
are available on request.
There are several reasons why our results differ from those of Neumann
and Rissman. 10 7 First, and most importantly, our dependent variables dif-
107. Neumann & Rissman, supra note 24.
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fer; that is, the quantity which we try to explain statistically differs. We
estimate the effects of termination-at-will restrictions on two quantities: the
number of employees for whom representation rights were sought by unions
(organizing effort), and the flow of workers into the union sector via NLRB
elections. In contrast, Neumann and Rissman estimate the effect of termi-
nation-at-will restrictions on the total change in union membership. As dis-
cussed above, union membership is affected by many things which have
nothing to do with changes in employee desires for union representation,
for example, shifts in employment from manufacturing to nonmanufactur-
ing, and employment declines within heavily unionized industries. Since it
is very difficult to adequately control for these other sources of union de-
cline, and because the emergence of termination-at-will restrictions may
have coincided with these other causes of union decline, we believe it is
preferable to limit our focus to changes in union membership that reflect
changes in employee desires for union representation, such as data on repre-
sentation elections.
Second, unlike Neumann and Rissman, we directly control for the in-
crease in illegal employer resistance to union organizing. Since this resist-
ance has been increasing at the same time that the judiciary has been
recognizing exceptions to the termination-at-will doctrine, failure to control
for employer resistance may have caused the judicial exception variables to
pick up the effect of increasing employer resistance. We also controlled for
state-specific effects, unlike Neumann and Rissman. Again, omission of
these variables may have caused the judicial exception variables to pick up
their effects.
Finally, although in examining the actual court cases we took great care
to determine in which states the judiciary has recognized termination-at-
will exceptions, and the scope of these exceptions, the, definition did not
matter empirically. Regardless of the definition utilized, our results and
conclusions were unaffected.
In sum, the results of this study provide no support for the hypothesis
that increased governmental protection of individual employees, provided
by judicially-recognized exceptions to the termination-at-will doctrine, has
reduced employee demand for union representation. On the contrary, our
results suggest that recognition of the tort of wrongful discharge is associ-
ated with greater union organizing efforts and an increased flow of new
workers into the union sector.
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V. UNION SUPPORT FOR TERMINATION-AT-WILL EXCEPTIONS
The AFL-CIO now urges the enactment of both federal and state limits
on the rule of termination-at-will."I Although the unions have not actively
campaigned against exceptions to the doctrine, this statement marked the
first time that the unions have indicated an intent to actively lobby for such
exceptions. 109
108. AFL-CIO Executive Council Statement on The Employment-At-Will Doctrine [hereinaf-
ter AFL-CIO Statement], delivered at the annual meeting of the Executive Council in Bal Har-
bour, Fla. on February 20, 1987.
109. Stieber, supra note 24, at 12 n.40; Stieber, Recent Developments in Employment-at-Will,
36 LAB. L.J. 557, 558, 562 (1985) [hereinafter Recent Developments].
Following the introductory section, the AFL-CIO argues for an unjust discharge law, which,
at a minimum, includes the following five elements:
A prohibition on discharges without cause. It is not enough to codify the exceptions to
the employment-at-will doctrine that have been judicially developed. What is required,
rather, is adoption of the rule that workers may be discharged only for cause and not
otherwise.
Financing to assure that discharged employees will be able to enforce their statutory
rights. Legal rules are of no consequence if they cannot be enforced, and individuals who
have lost their jobs cannot be expected to divert their scarce resources from sustaining
themselves and their families to retaining attorneys to litigate their discharge cases. An
unjust discharge law must therefore provide either for a government administrative en-
forcement system or for an alternative means of compensation of private representatives.
Prompt review of discharge decisions by an independent tribunal. Most workers cannot
afford to be without their livelihood for a sustained period of time. Consequently, if a
worker can be fired and required to engage in protracted litigation to secure review of the
discharge, workers will, in practice, continue to serve at their employer's pleasure. An
unjust discharge law therefore must establish adjudicative procedures that result in deci-
sions within a short time after a challenge to a discharge is filed.
Mandatory reinstatement for any employee who is found to have been discharged wrong-
fully. Most workers value their job not merely for the income it produces but also for the
opportunities for advancement and for the job security - and the other personal and social
benefits - derived only from steady employment. To make a wrongfully discharged em-
ployee whole, therefore, requires that the employee be reinstated to the job from which he
was wrongfully fired. Although it is questionable whether reinstatement can work in prac-
tice in an unorganized setting, nonetheless, a law that does not offer reinstatement to
wrongfully discharged workers cannot even begin to free workers from the capricious
power of their employers.
Full compensation for losses sustained as the result of a wrongful discharge. In many
instances, a worker who is fired suffers not only the loss of wages but also a host of conse-
quential injuries flowing from the loss of his/her livelihood. An innocent employee who
has been wrongfully discharged should not be left to bear those losses; rather, the wrong-
doing employer should be held responsible for these injuries.
AFL-CIO statement, supra note 108, at 3-4. The AFL-CIO Statement begins with the following
discussion:
The general acceptance in the United States of the concept that employers are entitled
to dismiss employees at any time, without any notice, for any reason whatsoever puts some
60 million non-union workers at risk. It is estimated that of these, roughly 150,000 work-
ers are unjustly discharged each year. And, the "employment-at-will" doctrine adversely
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Certainly there are a number of reasons why the AFL-CIO might favor
more formalized and expanded termination-at-will exceptions, particularly
affects all who are potentially subject to their employer's unbridled caprice by denying
these workers their natural right to be treated fairly and with respect. No other industrial
society continues to grant employers this feudal power that is totally inconsistent with our
concepts of individual dignity and worth.
Over the past several years, the courts in a number of states have made limited inroads
on the "employment-at-will" doctrine. Many courts have held that where an employee is
discharged for engaging in conduct the law seeks to protect or foster, the discharge violates
public policy and constitutes a tort. A handful of courts also have concluded that where
an employer, in personnel manuals or like documents, sets forth a policy governing dis-
charges, the employer is bound to adhere to his self-proclaimed policy as part of his con-
tract with his employees.
These belated judicial developments, while of course welcome, do not correct the essen-
tial conflicts between the "employment-at-will" doctrine and the legitimate concerns of
workers.
The "public policy" exception to the at-will rule, by its terms, is of very limited scope
and hence, even in theory, of benefit only to a small number of discharged employees. The
"contract" exception is one that employers easily circumvent by redrafting their personnel
manuals so as not to make any binding commitments.
The judicial exceptions to the at-will doctrine suffer as well from serious practical limi-
tations. Proving a violation in any event is a difficult task, especially under the public
policy exception which requires the plaintiff to show that the employer was motivated by
an improper purpose. Most workers who have lost their jobs do not have the resources to
retain counsel; consequently, only those with a strong likelihood of recovering substantial
moneys - most often formerly high-paid executives - have been able to secure the re-
sources to fight a case through the judicial system. Lastly, the sole remedy the courts have
provided an unjustly discharged employee is money damages, and not reinstatement to the
job from which the worker has been wrongfully removed.
Experience demonstrates that the surest way for workers to protect their jobs is
through self-organization and collective bargaining. One of the great accomplishments of
the American labor movement has been the negotiation of contract provisions that prohibit
discharges without just cause and that provide grievance-arbitration procedures through
which that job security is made real. Under these agreements, the union provides the
discharged employee with representation in challenging the discharge and, if the individual
prevails on his challenge, he or she will be reinstated to his or her job in a workplace where
the union stands ready to assure that on reinstatement the individual is fairly treated.
Studies show that in this context, reinstated employees are normally able to pick up
where they left off and are not likely to be picked out for retaliation for exercising their
rights. In contrast, in an unorganized workplace, even if the employees do enjoy certain
legal rights, they ordinarily do not have the wherewithal to enforce their rights. Moreover,
if an individual worker seeks to do so, he or she will have no protection from employer
reprisal. It is not surprising, therefore, that studies have found that employees who obtain
reinstatement to a non-union plant through order of the National Labor Relations Board
either elect not to return to their jobs or, if they do, leave their jobs within a year.
It is in good measure for these reasons that assisting unorganized employees to organ-
ize and to secure contractual protections from unjust discharges remains the labor move-
ment's first priority. At the same time, the AFL-CIO remains committed to its long-term
program of providing a base of support for the collective bargaining process through legis-
lation that seeks to assure every working American the basic labor standards that are the
hallmark of a decent society. There can be no doubt that protection against arbitrary
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if the union substitution hypothesis is invalid. The AFL-CIO itself ad-
vances a number of reasons why it is lobbying for exceptions to the termina-
tion-at-will doctrine. According to the statement of the Executive Council,
its primary motivation is to advance the interests of labor generally. 110
Helping labor generally has always been articulated by the unions as a ma-
jor priority. In light of the growing number of unorganized workers, it
seems obvious that a desire to protect labor must extend beyond the provi-
sion of union protections."'
In addition to any philosophical commitment that such an effort might
represent, the AFL-CIO stance should serve to provide a more positive im-
age of the unions. In recent years there has been some evidence that many
Americans do not have particularly positive feelings about unions.112
Whether these negative views result from detrimental media coverage or
some other factors, they certainly will not positively affect union growth.'1 3
The type of legislation that the AFL-CIO is supporting affects unorgan-
ized workers in a number of ways that current exceptions to the termina-
tion-at-will doctrine, particularly judicial exceptions, do not. For instance,
most cases that involved an exception to termination-at-will concerned the
dismissal of a white collar employee."' This finding is not especially sur-
prising. Bringing a lawsuit is a relatively expensive proposition and white
employer action qualifies as a basic labor standard. Thus, as state legislatures and the
United States Congress begin to. consider proposals to modify the employment-at-will doc-
trine, our policy is to support measures that safeguard workers against discharges without
cause.
Most of the legislative proposals that have been put forward reflect a lowest common
denominator approach which disserves the interest of workers. These proposals seem to
proceed on the basis that the precondition to modifying the employment-at-will doctrine is
the approval of the employer community as a whole. To secure that approval, it is sug-
gested that a set of limited employee rights and even more limited remedies enforceable
through an arbitration-type procedure that a discharged employee may invoke at his own
cost should be substituted for the current court law (which at least in some cases produces
large damage awards). The proposals are not worthy of organized labor's support.
Id. at 1-3.
110. See AFL-CIO Statement, supra note 109.
111. See supra notes. 1-11 and accompanying text.
112. See Bilik, Corrupt, Crusty or Neither? The Poll-ish View of .4merican Unions, 30 LAB.
L.J. 323, 324-26 (1979); Lipset, supra note 104.
113. For consideration of potential media effects on the image of unions, see, e.g., LIEBLING,
THE PRESS 157-73 (1964); Gould, supra note 17, at 32; Hoyt, Downtime for Labor, 22 COLUM.
JOURN. REV. 36-40 (1984); Hoyt, Is the Labor Press Doing Its Job?, 22 COLUM. JOURN. RFv. 34-
36 (1983).
114. Steiber, supra note 24, at 7-8. Whether or not the NLRA preempts the possibility of
employees covered by collective bargaining agreements bringing discharge suits in court continues
to be an issue. See, e.g., Brooks, Preemption of Federal Labor Law by the Employment-at-Will
Doctrine, 38 LAB. L.J. 335 (1987).
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collar workers are better able to afford to bring a suit. Likewise, with the
possibility of a large award, attorneys are more likely to be favorably in-
clined to bring a suit on a contingency basis. While passage of the legisla-
tion suggested by the AFL-CIO would not necessarily reduce the cost of
bringing suit," 5 it might increase the possibility of class action suits (for
instance in reduction-in-force cases) thereby increasing the potential for a
monetary award sufficient to support a contingency fee basis case.' 6 Alter-
natively, the AFL-CIO proposes that legislation could include some means
of defraying all or part of the costs of such litigation. 1 7 Presumably, the
unions could assume some of the costs, but this is unlikely. Some type of
court-appointed lawyer scheme might be arranged which, in effect, would
pass the cost of litigation to the government and, ultimately the taxpayers.
Finally, the AFL-CIO might propose that unsuccessful defendant-employ-
ers would pay all costs associated with the lawsuit.
Presumably, legislation would also make bringing a suit easier. While
legislation would not negate the need to examine the facts surrounding any
particular discharge situation, it might decrease litigation time and expense
by providing for alternative dispute resolution mechanisms such as arbitra-
tion. 1 ' Legislation may prove beneficial for employees involved in an or-
ganizing campaign, but not yet organized, since it is likely to provide a
somewhat more generous time frame for bringing an action than current
NLRB policies." 9 Certainly, the possibility of monetary damages would
broaden the scope of remedies available for union employees, since cur-
rently, redress from arbitrators and the NLRB does not extend to monetary
awards. 20
In an earlier section of this Article, the authors discussed three of the
reasons most commonly advanced for the decline of union membership: (1)
structural changes in the economy, (2) union or government substitution,
and (3) employer animus.12  Obviously, there is little that the unions can
do to directly influence structural changes in the economy. They can, of
course, change their organizing tactics to reflect the change in type of indus-
try and they can concentrate organizing efforts in the growing industrial
115. If, as the AFL-CIO proposes, supra notes 108 and 109, unjust discharge cases were
settled or decided by some administrative means, the costs of such an action might be less than a
court case.
116. Smith, supra note 30, at 889.
117. See AFL-CIO Statement, supra note 108.
118. Id.
119. Zimmerman & Howard-Martin, supra note 74, at 234.
120. Smith, supra note 30, at 876-79.
121. See supra notes 1-46 and accompanying text.
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areas of the South and West. Indeed, a number of authors call on the un-
ions to revise their organizing tactics to take these structural changes into
account. 122 Although the unions have and will continue to heed such ad-
vice, history suggests that these areas have been traditionally difficult to
organize, although union win rates in NLRB elections are currently higher
in some service-type industries than in manufacturing. 123
In any event, changes in organizing efforts alone may not be sufficient to
stabilize union membership figures, let alone to reverse the decline in
growth. To the extent that employer animus towards the unions is resulting
in continuing and perhaps increasing union suppression, union leaders will
need to find ways to minimize this suppression, if not the animus, in order
for any organizing efforts to be successful. Under the current laws, employ-
ers may be able to fire employees who have, or who the employer suspects
have, union sympathies if the employees are neither actively involved in a
formal organizing campaign nor deemed to be working as part of a "con-
certed activity" in favor of union representation. 124 If, under the AFL-CIO
proposal, remedies for unjust discharge are expanded to include reinstate-
ment as well as monetary award, workers who may have been discharged
based on real or perceived union sympathies, or who were not viewed as
part of a "concerted activity," can be reinstated and may be able to posi-
tively effect union organizing, particularly if reinstatement occurs prior to
the union election. 125
VI. CONCLUSION
Until the downward trend in union membership is at least halted, if not
reversed, union supporters will continue to attempt to identify both the
causes of the decline and ways to encourage union representation. This
Article has focused on one factor that has been advanced as a reason for
membership decline: the advent of judicially-created exceptions to the ter-
mination-at-will doctrine. Proponents of this argument suggest that as
courts expanded the reasons for which employees either could not be law-
122. See, e.g., Craver, supra note 4, at 215; Gould, supra note 17; Usery & Henne, supra note
4, at 257.
123. Craver, supra note 8.
124. Zimmerman & Howard-Martin, supra note 74, at 232. For a comparison of discharge
rates of union and non-union employers see Recent Developments, supra note 109, at 559. Fur-
thermore, according to Weiler, supra note 12, at 1781, "the current odds are about one in twenty
that a union supporter will be fired for exercising rights supposedly guaranteed by federal law
.... " Id.
125. The need for timely reinstatement is suggested by the AFL-CIO proposal. It calls for
"prompt review of discharge decisions," as well as mandatory reinstatement. See AFL-CIO State-
ment, supra note 108; see also Weiler, supra note 12, at 1792-93.
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fully terminated or could be granted remedies for such firings, the impor-
tance of the just cause provisions in collective bargaining agreements would
be undermined. Hence, the argument continues, the perceived need for
union representation would be diminished and membership would decline.
This Article, and the authors' study discussed herein, have attempted to
refute this argument. The results of our study do not indicate that judi-
cially-created exceptions to the termination-at-will doctrine negatively af-
fect union membership. While it is not equally clear that exceptions will
foster union growth, it is at least plausible that if such exceptions serve to
preclude terminations based on union sympathies, union growth might well
be enhanced. If the unions cannot eliminate or substantially decrease em-
ployer animus, protection of union supporters from termination based on
that support may provide some measure of optimism for the unions' cloudy
future.
